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INTRODUCTION

While biotechnology has been advancing apace in numerous
areas, few of its advances spur as much controversy and passion as
those concerning human reproduction. Modern reproductive
technology can allow a complete split between various parental
roles that once were necessarily bound in most circumstances. A
child created through assisted reproductive technology (ART)
might have a genetic mother, a genetic father, any number of
social/intended parents, and a gestational mother. Society is now
faced with the question of who the child’s parents are; mere
biology can no longer answer that question. By allowing a person
to become a parent regardless of his or her reproductive capacity,
ART, in particular surrogacy arrangements, forces us to confront
deeply held beliefs about what makes a “mother” or a “father,” and
indeed, what makes a “woman” or a “man,” and perhaps most
fundamentally, what makes a “family.” A survey of the vast diversity
of laws governing surrogacy, which range from laws banning any
surrogacy arrangement as “baby-selling” to those which take an
almost pure contract approach, reveals that the legal terrain
surrounding these agreements is as varied as the beliefs
surrounding gender, sex, and reproduction. Surrogacy, more than
any other ART technique, incites such heated feeling and such
diverse legal responses because it calls into question our
fundamental cultural assumptions about kinship, about who is a
parent, and moreover, about who is a mother.
II. BACKGROUND
Traditionally, “families” have been defined to a large extent by
biology. Genetic connection has been the major foundation of
most families, and roles within families were as much a product of
age and sex as of individual characteristics and aptitudes. The only
options for a person to become a “mother” or a “father” were
through sexual intercourse or adoption, and until quite recently in
the Western world, social and often legal strictures limited both of
1
those choices to married heterosexuals. The advent of the various
ART techniques, and the seemingly sudden ability of nontraditional individuals and couples to become parents outside the
1. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2005). The current Florida law
disallows homosexuals to adopt, although heterosexual single people are currently
allowed to adopt. See id. § 63.042(2)(b), .042(3).
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purview of legal regulation, has blown up a powder keg of
questions about gender and family roles as well as when and
whether ART is permissible.
Surrogacy arrangements, also known as gestational carrier
arrangements, are perhaps the best example of the power of ART
to alter radically and indeed fundamentally who may be considered
a “family.” Surrogacy has numerous permutations; simply knowing
a child was produced through surrogacy reveals nothing about its
genetic ties to either the intended parents or the surrogate.
Surrogacy’s permutations can include situations where:
• A surrogate serves solely as the gestational mother to a
child who is the genetic offspring of both intended
parents (often called “gestational surrogacy”);
• A surrogate serves solely as the gestational mother to a
child who is the genetic offspring of one intended
parent with a donor gamete;
• A surrogate serves solely as the gestational mother to a
child who is the genetic offspring of neither intended
parent, but rather was conceived with donor gametes;
• A surrogate serves as both the genetic and the
gestational mother to a child who is the genetic
offspring of the intended father (often called
“traditional surrogacy”); or
• A surrogate serves as both the genetic and the
gestational mother to a child conceived with donor
gametes (although, this is rarely done, as the surrogate
and her husband, if any, would be the only people with
any legal claim to the child in a number of
jurisdictions).
With so many different levels of genetic relationships possible
between the intended parent(s) and the child, surrogacy allows a
level of role-severing between the biological and the social that few
other ART techniques parallel. This is in no small part because the
common element in all surrogacy arrangements is that the element
of pregnancy and giving birth is moved from the intended mother,
if there is one, to the gestational mother.
While the role of “father” has never been exclusively based on
2
biological kinship, inclusion in the category not just of “mother,”
2. See J.N.R. v. O’Reilly, 264 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2008). In O’Reilly, the Kentucky
Supreme Court held that the biological father of a child born to another man’s
wife during the marriage has no standing to seek parental rights to the child, who
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but indeed in the category of “woman,” is and has been deeply tied
3
to reproductive capacity, specifically pregnancy and birth. Beyond
the ken of adoption, childlessness by choice, and other ART
techniques, surrogacy arouses cultural and legislative ire because it
challenges the fundamental categories of “woman” and of
“mother” as something not tied to pregnancy.
Surrogacy arrangements have drawn public praise and furor
ever since Kim Cotton gave birth to a baby girl in 1985 and was
investigated by Scotland Yard for receiving payment for being a
4
surrogate. Surrogacy arrangements riveted the United States, and
in 1986 brought to the forefront the murky legal waters
5
surrounding ART, with the Baby M case. In the twenty years since
Baby M, there has been little resolution of the controversy
surrounding surrogacy and similarly little resolution of the legal
status of such arrangements.
Those who object to surrogacy give a litany of reasons: that it
6
commodifies both women and life, that “women’s biologically
based experience of pregnancy” is such that contracts cannot be
7
fairly enforceable, that there is no way to know that a surrogate has
8
truly and freely consented to the arrangement, that it reinforces
class and racial strata (because poor and minority women are
9
believed more likely to be induced by payment of a surrogacy fee),
and, of course, that it is not natural. While some feminists and
other scholars base their objections to surrogacy on concerns about
human dignity, most of the controversy surrounding surrogacy
stems from our “cultural ambivalence about families not based on
10
genetic ties.”
legally is the child of the mother’s husband. Id. at 595.
3. See generally MARDY S. IRELAND, RECONCEIVING WOMEN: SEPARATING
MOTHERHOOD FROM FEMALE IDENTITY (1993).
4. 1985: Inquiry Over ‘Baby-For-Cash’ Deal, BBC NEWS, Jan. 4, 1985,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/january/4/newsid_2495000/2
495857.stm.
5. See Elizabeth Kolbert, A Dispute on Baby M, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1986, at B6,
available at 1986 WLNR 844985.
6. Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of
Life, WOMEN HEALTH, 1987, at 95–100.
7. MARY LYNDON SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES, MAKING FAMILIES: WHAT MATTERS
MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAMESEX AND UNWED PARENTS, 104 (2001).
8. Id. at 107.
9. Barbara Katz Rothman, Cheap Labor: Sex, Class, Race—and “Surrogacy,”
SOC’Y, Mar.–Apr. 1988, at 21–22.
10. Jean Benward, Lecture at American Society for Reproductive Medicine
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The court in Baby M highlighted the questions of
“motherhood” and “parenthood” that haunt surrogacy
arrangements today, stating: “[t]he intent of the contract is that the
child’s natural mother will thereafter be forever separated from her
child. . . . The contract providing for this is called a ‘surrogacy
contract,’ the natural mother inappropriately called the ‘surrogate
11
mother.’”
Thus, for the New Jersey Supreme Court, and for some courts
and legislatures since, one’s status as a “natural” (which, in this
instance, is taken to mean “biological”) parent has been accorded
great credence.
It is this question of “naturalness” that frames most of the
debate about surrogacy, and where various legislatures and courts
fall regarding this question that has led to such inconsistent law
around the topic. The naturalness question is also inevitably
fraught with questions of sex and gender due to the fact that there
is no male analog to surrogacy, because there is no male analog to
pregnancy. In evaluating surrogacy, there has been a largely
unspoken bias in favor of gestation as the defining element of
“natural mother” at play in many courts and legislatures. While it is
true that “natural mother” is by no means synonymous with “birth
12
mother,” in a vast majority of states, the legal status of a woman
who cannot carry a pregnancy is uncertain at best, even if the child
is genetically hers.
Nonetheless, surrogacy has persisted and even thrived, in no
small part because it often offers the best option for those faced
with female infertility who either want a child that is biologically
related to one parent or potentially both parents or for those who
are unwilling or unable to go through the rigors of the adoption
process.

2005 Conference, Adoption and Gamete Donation: Similarities and Difference
(Oct. 15–16, 2005).
11. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988).
12. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 93 (1993). The woman who
intended to “bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her
own—is the natural mother under California law.” Id.
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III. THE LAW AS IT IS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY

13

Alabama
Alaska

14

15

Enforceable

Probably
Enforceable

Uncertain

Probably
Unenforceable

Unenforceable

Surrogacy
Contracts are…

Criminalized

The vast majority of states are silent or near silent on the issues
of whether, when, and how surrogacy agreements are enforceable,
void, or voidable. Of those states that do have laws on the books
regarding such agreements, the responses range from relying
heavily on the Uniform Parentage Act or party intent to outright
bans or even criminalization of surrogacy. In many of the states
that are “silent” on surrogacy, bills have been shot back-and-forth
through the legislature but come to naught.
The following tables present the status of surrogacy in the
states and the District of Columbia. In the tables, the acronyms
used include: GLBT (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgendered); IP
(Intended Parent); G (Gestational Surrogacy); T (Traditional
Surrogacy); U (Uncompensated); and C (Compensated):

x
x

13. Most initial resources for finding state laws in this area, statutory and case,
came from the Human Rights Campaign’s State Surrogacy Law Listing,
http://www.hrc.org/laws_and_elections/state_law_listing.asp.
14. ALA. CODE §§ 26-10A-33 to -34 (1992); Brasfield v. Brasfield, 679 So. 2d
1091 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (addressing “baby-buying” as explicitly excluding
surrogacy). In Brasfield, the wife in a divorce was awarded custody of the couple’s
children who were conceived and born through a traditional surrogacy
arrangement. Brasfield, 670 So. 2d at 1092, 1095.
15. See In re T.N.F., 781 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1989). In re T.N.F. is the only Alaska
case to touch on surrogacy, but this case does not address the merits. Id. at 981–
82. The Alaska Supreme Court decided the Petitioner’s petition for certiorari on
procedural grounds. Id.
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x

17

California
Colorado

x

19

18

x
x

16. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007); See Soos v. Superior Court ex rel.
County of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). Section 25-218 states
that “[n]o person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure or otherwise assist in
the formation of a surrogate parentage contract” and makes explicit that it
includes both gestational and traditional surrogacy in its purview. ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-218 (2007). In Soos, however, the Court of Appeals overruled this
statute as being in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Soos, 897 P.2d at
1359–61. No higher court has heard this matter, so presumably, the statute still
stands in all Arizona counties outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals of
Arizona, Division One.
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2008); See In re Samant, 970 S.W.2d 249 (Ark.
1998); See also In re Adoption of K.F.H., 844 S.W.2d 343 (Ark. 1993). Section 9-10201 provides that a child conceived pursuant to a surrogacy arrangement shall be
the child of: “(1) The biological father and the woman intended to be the mother
if the biological father is married; (2) The biological father only if unmarried; or
(3) The woman intended to be the mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an
anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.” ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-201.
18. Although the issue of GLBT intended parents in a surrogacy arrangement
has not been specifically addressed in Arkansas, and indeed, its liberal statute
currently draws many GLBT individuals there for surrogacy services, the state is
deeply embroiled over whether or not GLBT individuals should be allowed to
foster children. See Sides Argue Over Arkansas Foster Parent Restriction, TEXARKANA
GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 2008, available at http://www.texarkanagazette.com/news/
WireHeadlines/2008/10/03/sides-argue-over-arkansas-foster-parent--58.php;
Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Proposes Banning Gay Foster Parents, THE SUN (New York),
Aug. 26, 2008, available at http://www.nysun.com/national/arkansas-proposesbanning-gay-foster-parents/84594/. One must wonder whether or not a GLBT
couple would be allowed parental rights in the event of litigation over a surrogacy
arrangement.
19. California’s case law concerning surrogacy is almost legend, it is so wellknown. Although the state has yet to enact statutory language explicitly
authorizing and regulating surrogacy, its case law addresses the issue extensively,
with large reliance on the Uniform Parentage Act and emphasis on the intent of
the parties. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540 (West 2004); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776, 778–83 (Cal. 1993); Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 283–90, 292–
94 (Ct. App. 1998); In Re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 895–901,
903 (Ct. App. 1994).
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Connecticut
Delaware

Florida

x

20

21

District of
22
Columbia

x
x
x (If IPs
married)

23

Georgia

x

Hawaii

x

Idaho

24

Illinois

[Vol. 35:2

x

25

Indiana

26

Iowa

x (T)

x (G)

x
x

x

20. See Doe v. Roe, 717 A.2d 706 (Conn. 1998); Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297
(Conn. 1998); Vogel v. Kirkbride, No. FA 02-0471850, 2002 WL 34119315 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). Although no Connecticut court has explicitly stated
that surrogacy contracts themselves are valid, in Vogel, the court held, in regards to
a gestational surrogacy arranged by a gay couple that “[t]he egg donor agreement
and the gestational carrier agreement [were] valid, enforceable, irrevocable and of
full legal effect.” Vogel, 2002 WL 34119315, at *1. The court ordered both
intended fathers’ names placed on the child’s birth certificate. Vogel, 2002 WL
34119315, at *1.
21. See Hawkins v. Frye, No. 87-7-5CVS, 1988 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS 31, at
*7–*11 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 25, 1988) (relying on the reasoning found in Baby M,
the court held that a contract to terminate parental rights outside the context of
an adoption proceeding would not be recognized). See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d
1227 (N.J. 1988).
22. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-401 to -402 (LexisNexis 2001). Both traditional
and gestational surrogacy arrangements are void and unenforceable, and
punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, a year in jail, or both. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.16 (West 2005). The terms of surrogacy agreement
permissible under the Florida statute are discussed infra notes 62–65.
24. DeBernardi v. Steve B.D., 723 P.2d 829 (Idaho 1986). Under Idaho’s
best-interest custody standard, a surrogate mother who relinquishes a child to the
intended parents through adoption procedures can be obligated to abide by that
relinquishment if it were not made under fraud or duress. Id.
25. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 to 47/75 (West Supp. 2008). The Illinois
statutes set forth the (admittedly narrow) circumstances in which surrogacy
arrangements will be approved in Illinois. Id.
26. IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (2008) (“[T]he general assembly declares
that it is against public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate agreement that
requires a surrogate to . . . [w]aive parental rights or duties to a child.”).
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x

Kentucky

28

Louisiana

x (T
C)

29

Maine
30

Maryland
Massachusetts

x
x(U
G)
x

x (C )

x (U)
x

31

Michigan

32

x

Minnesota

x

Mississippi

x

Missouri
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33

x

Montana
Nebraska

x
34

x (C )

x (U)

27. 29 Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 96–73 (Sept. 11, 1996), 1996 Kan. A.G. LEXIS
73; 54 Op. Kan. Att’y Gen. No. 82--150 (July 2, 1982), 1982 Kan. A.G. LEXIS 137.
These two Attorney General opinions indicate that surrogacy agreements are void
against public policy as a commoditization of motherhood.
28. Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong, 704
S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986), discussed infra note 95 and accompanying text; Op. Ky.
Att’y Gen. No. OAG 81-18 (Jan. 26, 1981), 1981 WL 142305.
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2005) (“[A] contract for surrogate
motherhood as defined herein shall be absolutely null and shall be void and
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.”).
30. MD. CODE. ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-327 (LexisNexis 2002); MD. CODE. ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 3-603 (LexisNexis 2002); 85 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 348 (2000), 2000 WL
1922187; Abby Brandel, Legislating Surrogacy: A Partial Answer to Feminist Criticism,
54 MD. L. REV. 488 (1995). There is almost no consensus as to whether or not
surrogacy agreements would be enforceable in Maryland, and the Attorney
General opinions cited indicate that compensated surrogacy would run afoul of
the statutes cited, which ban payment for adoption.
31. Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 1133 (Mass.
2001); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (illustrating that Massachusetts
case law indicates that uncompensated surrogacy arrangements will be upheld;
however, the surrogate has four days after the birth of the child to change her
mind).
32. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851–.861 (West 2002); Doe v. Attorney
Gen., 487 N.W.2d 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that any and all surrogacy agreements are void).
33. MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.175 (West 1999). Surrogacy arrangements could
run afoul of Missouri law banning trafficking in children.
34. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-21,200 (LexisNexis 2004). The Nebraska
statute explicitly forbids surrogacy agreements. Id. § 25-21,200(1). The custody is
split between the gestational mother and the biological father of the child. Id.
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x (If IPs
married)

35

New
36
Hampshire
37
New Jersey
New Mexico
39

New York
North
40
Carolina
North
41
Dakota
42
Ohio

Oklahoma

38

x
x (T)

x (U G)
x (U)

x (C )
x

x (U)
x (T)

x (G)
x

43

x (C)

x (U)

35. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (LexisNexis 2004).
36. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168:B-16, -20 (LexisNexis 2001).
37. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000); see discussion supra notes 5–11 and accompanying
text.
38. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34 (West Supp. 2008). Surrogacy fees are
banned. Id. § 32A-5-34(F). However, reasonable expenses associated therewith
are permissible. Id. § 32A-5-34(B)(1)–(8).
39. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 1999) (“[N]o person or other
entity shall knowingly request, accept, receive, pay or give any fee, compensation
or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with any surrogate
parenting contract, or induce, arrange or otherwise assist in arranging a surrogate
parenting contract for a fee, compensation or other remuneration . . . .”).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-10-102, -103 (West 2007).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (Supp. 2007). In regards to surrogacy
agreements:
[A]ny agreement in which a woman agrees to become a
surrogate or to relinquish that woman's rights and duties as
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is void.
The surrogate, however, is the mother of a resulting child and
the surrogate's husband, if a party to the agreement, is the
father of the child.
Id.
42. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.89 (West 2005); Decker v. Decker, No. 5-0123, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4389 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2001); Turchyn v.
Cornelius, No. 98 CA 86, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4129 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 26,
1999); Seymour v. Stotski, 611 N.E.2d 454 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Belsito v. Clark,
67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1994). The law in Ohio regarding surrogacy is
incredibly unsettled.
43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); 15 Op. Okla. Att’y Gen. 277 (1983), 1983 WL 174961
(indicating that surrogacy agreements run counter to the state’s law prohibiting
trafficking in children).
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Oregon

44

x (C )

Pennsylvania

45
46

Rhode Island
South
47
Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

x (U)
x
x (T)

x (G)
x (If IPs
married)

x
x (If IPs
married)
x (If IPs
married)
x (If IPs
married)

48

49

50

Vermont
Virginia

51

52

459

x
(Includin
g GLBT
IPs)
x (U,

44. 46 Op. Or. Att’y Gen. 221 (1989), 1989 WL 439814. See In re Adoption of
Baby A and Baby B, 877 P.2d 107 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). Oregon case law indicates
that uncompensated surrogacy agreements will be upheld, while compensated
agreements will be upheld only if the surrogate were not induced by the payment.
In re Adoption of Baby A, 877 P.2d at 107–08.
45. See Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., Inc., 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997); Ruth F. v. Robert B., Jr., 690 A.2d 1171 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). The law in
Pennsylvania is unsettled, but it appears that compensated surrogacy agreements
will not be upheld. See Ruth F., 690 A.2d at 1176–77.
46. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-16.4-2 (2001). The statutory ban on cloning explicitly
excludes ART used for gestational surrogacy. Id. A sunset clause was added by the
legislature. Id. § 23-16.4-4 (Supp. 2007).
47. Mid-South Ins. Co. v. Doe, 274 F. Supp. 2d 757 (D.S.C. 2003). In
interpreting the terms of a surrogacy agreement, although not explicitly finding
that such agreements are enforceable, the court assumed that such an agreement
was not contradictory to state law. Id. at 762–64.
48. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102 (2005). Tennessee is another state whose law
is unclear. While the statute encompasses both traditional and gestational
surrogacy in its definition, and provides a process by which the rights of the
surrogate may be terminated, it also disclaims its authorization of such
arrangements "unless otherwise approved by the courts or the general assembly."
Id. § 36-1-102(48).
49. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.754, .762 (Vernon Supp. 2008). See
discussion infra notes 80–81.
50. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801 (Supp. 2008). See discussion infra notes
82–84.
51. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (2008). See discussion infra notes 85–88.
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x (C)

If IPs
married)
x (U)

54

x

55

Wyoming

x
x

With the notable exception of California, three issues most
sharply divide legislatures and courts regarding whether the rights
of intended parents under a surrogacy arrangement will be
recognized: whether the surrogacy is traditional or gestational,
whether the surrogate is compensated beyond expenses, and the
marital status and sexual orientation of the intended parents. Of
states that limit surrogacy arrangements to those situations where
intended parents are married, a number limit marriage to
heterosexuals. While most of the states that place such limits on
surrogacy claim they act in the best interest of the child or for
moral reasons, the strong undercurrent of traditional notions of
biological kinship and gender primacy in determining what
constitutes a “family” is apparent.
In states where surrogacy is banned or legally uncertain,
paternity or parentage laws generally place parental rights in the
surrogate; the intended father, the surrogate’s husband, both, or
neither share parental rights, depending on the jurisdiction and
the child’s genetic provenance. Intended mothers are the losers.
According to the table, the following states explicitly allow
surrogacy: Arkansas, California, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington. In those jurisdictions, the procedures to
make the intended parents the legal parents range from
straightforward to arcane. In such jurisdictions, the rights of the
53. WASH. REV. CODE. §§ 26.26.101, .210–.260 (West 2005); Surrogate Parent
Agreements—Children-Parent and Child-Adoption-Parental or Spousal Consent—
Department of Social and Health Services, 1989 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 4 (Feb.
17, 1989), 1989 WL 428954, at *2–*4. Uncompensated surrogacy agreements are
permissible; compensated surrogacy agreements are a violation of state law and
punishable as a gross misdemeanor. See 1989 Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 4, at
*2–*4.
54. W. VA. CODE § 48-22-803(e)(3) (2004). Although the statute does not
explicitly permit surrogacy agreements, it states that fees and expenses associated
with surrogacy are not prohibited. Id.
55. WIS. STAT. § 69.14(1)(h) (Supp. 2008).
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intended mother tend to be firmest. In states with no explicit
acknowledgement of surrogacy or with an absence of procedures
for establishing the intended parents as the legal parents, both
intended parents, but particularly the intended mother, risk losing
rights to the child. Intended fathers often have the right to pursue
parental rights through a paternity action, assuming they are the
genetic father of the child; intended mothers often have no legal
recourse in those jurisdictions without procedures for
acknowledging surrogacy arrangements. Even in those states that
are permissive of such arrangements, the procedure by which
intended parents become legal parents remains largely within the
purview of the judiciary.
A. Arkansas
The applicable Arkansas statute states: “[F]or birth registration
purposes, in cases of surrogate mothers the woman giving birth
shall be presumed to be the natural mother and shall be listed as
such on the certificate of birth, but a substituted certificate of birth
56
may be issued upon orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.”
Arkansas does not require any process, including adoption,
nor does it provide an opportunity for the surrogate to change her
57
mind. Instead, the intended parents are made the legal parents
58
of the child by operation of law.
B.

California

Because California’s procedure relies on case law, it is quite
flexible and has enabled California practitioners to obtain
successfully parental rights for single men, single women,
59
Listing the intended
heterosexual couples and GLBT couples.
parent(s) on a child’s birth certificate requires a Superior Court
judgment that acknowledges a surrogacy agreement and the
individuals seeking to be listed on the birth certificate are indeed
60
the intended parents of the child. Upon such a judgment, the
California Office of Vital Statistics will allow only the intended
56. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(2) (2008).
57. See id. § 9-10-201.
58. See id. § 9-10-201(b)–(c)(1).
59. See Thomas M. Pinkerton, Surrogacy and Egg Donation Law in California,
THE AM. SURROGACY CENTER, INC., Mar. 2001, http://www.surrogacy.com/legals/
article/calaw.html.
60. Id.
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61

C. Florida
Florida’s processes for making the intended parents the legal
parents of the child are explicitly stated at FLA. STAT. section
742.16: The intended parents must petition the court within three
days of the child’s birth for an “expedited affirmation of parental
status,” at which point the court shall schedule a hearing on the
62
matter. The intended parents must give notice to: the gestational
surrogate, the treating physician of the assisted reproductive
technology program, and any party claiming paternity in
63
The
accordance with the Florida rules of civil procedure.
intended parents and their legal representative shall appear at the
hearing; upon a finding that the intended parents and the
surrogate entered into a valid, enforceable surrogacy contract,
pursuant to FLA. STAT. section 742.15, and that at least one of the
intended parents is the child’s genetic parent, the court shall enter
an order finding the intended parents to be the legal parent of the
64
child.
Within thirty days after entry of the order, the clerk of the
court shall prepare a certified statement of the order for the state
registrar of vital statistics on a form provided by the registrar. The
court shall thereupon enter an order requiring the Department of
Health to issue a new birth certificate naming the commissioning
couple as parents and requiring the department to seal the original
65
birth certificate.
D. Illinois
The applicable Illinois statute sets forth the very narrow
circumstances in which surrogacy arrangements will be enforced in
that state. Under the statute, the child is the legitimate child of the
66
intended mother and father immediately upon birth, with sole
67
The
custody vesting in the intended parents at that time.
requirements for a legitimate surrogacy arrangement under the
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 742.16(1)–(2) (2005 & Supp. 2008).
Id. § 742.16(2), (4).
Id. § 742.16(6).
Id. § 742.16(8).
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15(b)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2008).
Id. 47/15(b)(5).
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statute, including medical and mental evaluations and proof of
68
medical necessity for a surrogacy, however, are quite onerous.
E. Nevada
The Nevada statute states that two people whose marriage is
valid under Nevada law (i.e., a married heterosexual couple) may
69
enter into a surrogacy agreement. Under the statute, a “person
identified as an intended parent in [an enforceable surrogacy
contract] must be treated in law as a natural parent under all
70
circumstances.”
F.

New Hampshire

To be enforceable, a surrogacy agreement in New Hampshire
must be preauthorized by the probate court in the county in which
the parties reside before any surrogacy procedures begin; either
the surrogate or the intended parents must have been New
Hampshire residents for six months prior to the filing of the
71
petition. The court shall hold a hearing within ninety days of the
72
filing of the petition, at which Petitioners must be present.
Should the court find everything to be in conformity to the
statutory requirements, the court shall enter a judicial order
validating the surrogacy arrangement; such order automatically
terminates the parental rights of the surrogate and her husband,
with said rights to vest in the intended parents upon birth of the
73
child. It must be noted, however, that the New Hampshire law
preserves the right of the surrogate to keep the child if, at any
point before seventy-two hours after the child’s birth, she notifies
74
the intended parents of her intent to do so in writing.
G. New Jersey
Although New Jersey is perhaps most famous for banning
surrogacy as baby-selling in the Baby M case, it has actually
developed a common law whereby gestational surrogacy is
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. 47/20, 47/25.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.045 (2004).
Id. § 126.045(2).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16, B:20 (LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2008).
Id. §§ 168-B:22–23.
Id. § 168-B:23.
Id. §168-B:25.
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75

enforceable, as long as it is uncompensated.
The procedure
forbids having the surrogate enter into any binding agreement
before the child’s birth, and she indeed has seventy-two hours after
76
Assuming the
the child’s birth to decide to keep the child.
surrogate relinquishes the child, the intended parents have two
77
days to be placed on the child’s birth certificate.
H. North Dakota
The North Dakota Code provides “[a] child born to a
gestational carrier is a child of the intended parents for all
purposes and is not a child of the gestational carrier and the
78
The intended parents
gestational carrier’s husband, if any.”
79
become the legal parents once the embryo is implanted.
I.

Texas

Texas law authorizes a gestational agreement if the parties seek
80
authorization of said agreement from the courts. Once the court
has validated such an agreement, the intended parents are to file
notice of the child’s birth within 300 days of the date on which the
assisted reproduction occurred, at which point the court will enter
an order that does the following:
(1) confirms that the intended parents are the child’s
parents;
(2) requires the gestational mother to surrender the
child to the intended parents, if necessary; and
(3) requires the bureau of vital statistics to issue a birth
certificate naming the intended parents as the child’s
81
parents.

75. A.H.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 948 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3–41 subdiv. e, 26:8–28 (2004))
(discussing that the gestational carrier must wait the requisite 72 hours before
deciding to give up the child and the intended parents must sign the birth
certificate within 5 days of the birth, thereby creating the 48 hour window in which
the intended parents can act to enter a binding agreement).
78. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-08 (Supp. 2007).
79. Center for American Progress, Guide to State Surrogacy Laws (Dec. 17,
2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/surrogacy_laws.html.
80. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.755 (Vernon Supp. 2008).
81. Id. § 160.760.
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Utah

The Utah Code allows gestational surrogacy upon validation by
the court, as long as one of the intended parents is the child’s
82
There is a residence requirement of at least
genetic parent.
ninety days for either the gestational mother or the intended
83
Should the parties fail to seek pre-approval of the
parents.
agreement from the court, the child’s parentage will be
determined according to traditional parentage rules embodied in
84
the Utah Parentage Act.
K. Virginia
Sections 20--156 of the Virginia Code established the terms
under which surrogacy agreements are enforceable in Virginia. A
surrogate, her husband, if any, and the intended parents may enter
into a surrogacy agreement provided that the parties receive
approval from the circuit court of the county in which one of the
parties resides prior to the commencement of any surrogacy
85
procedures. After making extensive required findings, the court
will then “enter an order approving the surrogacy contract and
authorizing the performance of assisted conception” procedures
86
for “twelve months after the entry of the order.” Within seven
days of the child’s birth, the intended parents are to provide the
court with written notice that the child was born; medical evidence
substantiating that one of the intended parents is the genetic
87
Finally, the court
parent of the child must then be entered.
enters “an order directing the State Registrar of Vital Records to
issue a new birth certificate naming the intended parents” as the
88
child’s parents.

82. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-801 to -809 (Supp. 2008).
83. Id. § 78B-15-802(2).
84. See id. § 78B-15-809(2) (“[I]f a birth results under a gestational agreement
that is not judicially validated as provided in this part, the parent-child relationship
is determined as provided in Part 2, Parent-child Relationship.”). Chapter 15 of
the Utah Code Annotated is entitled “Utah Uniform Parentage Act.” Id. § 78B-15101.
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160(A) (2008).
86. Id. § 20-160(B).
87. Id. § 20-160(D).
88. Id.
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L. Washington
Washington explicitly forbids compensated surrogacy, while
89
implicitly authorizing uncompensated surrogacy. When there is a
dispute between a surrogate and the intended parents as to the
custody of the child, the child is left in the physical custody of the
90
party having such custody. The court is to resolve the dispute in
91
accordance with various child custody considerations.
Clearly, the path to legal parenthood through surrogacy is
onerous and requires legal counsel even in those states which are
friendly to surrogacy arrangements. New Hampshire’s preservation
of the surrogate’s right to back out of the agreement indicates the
92
high degree of deference shown towards gestation. Unlike men,
who are typically guaranteed rights to their wives’ biological
children under rebuttable presumptions of paternity, intended
mothers’ rights are largely contingent upon the continued goodwill
93
In
of the surrogate even in some pro-surrogacy jurisdictions.
those jurisdictions where there is neither explicit recognition nor
explicit prohibition of surrogacy agreements, the intended parents
94
are usually made the legal parents of the child through adoption.
If the intended father is the genetic father, he may initiate a
paternity action and seek custody of the child. If the surrogate
then relinquishes her rights to the child, the intended mother may
become the child’s legal mother through second-parent adoption.
Even if the intended father is not the child’s genetic father, it is
possible for the intended parents to become the legal parents of
the child if the surrogate relinquishes her rights; at that point, the
intended parents pursue the adoption process of the jurisdiction.
Regardless of what process is pursued to secure the intended
mother’s rights, the fact remains that her rights are a mere
extension of her husband’s, no more than those of a step-parent, in
the vast majority of jurisdictions.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Surrogate Parenting Associates,
89. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210–.240 (West 2005). Compensation
under a surrogate parentage contract is prohibited. Id. § 26.26.230.
90. Id. § 26.26.260.
91. Id.
92. See N.H. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:27 (LexisNexis 2001) (“[T]here shall be no
specific performance for a breach by the surrogate of a surrogacy contract term
that: I. requires her to become impregnated; II. requires her to have an abortion;
or III. forbids her to have an abortion.”).
93. See supra notes 74, 76, 90 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 21, 37.
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95

Inc. v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Armstrong, wrote provocatively about
the gender issues involved in reproductive technology:
[N]o one suggests that where the husband is infertile and
conception is induced by artificial insemination of the
wife that the participants involved, the biological father,
the physicians who care for the mother and deliver the
child, or the attorneys who arranged the procedure, have
violated the statutes now in place. Although this is
tampering with nature in the same manner as the
surrogate parenting procedure here involved, we
recognize “[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear
a child is at the very heart . . . of constitutionally protected
96
choices.”
It sounds good, but is the analogy sound? In cases of artificial
insemination, we turn to another man’s biological materials to
solve problems of male infertility. Although there is disunity
between biological father and social father, the rebuttable
presumptions of paternity afforded to married men resolve the
disunity in favor of the mother’s husband. In the case of surrogacy,
however, there is no such simple resolution of the disunity.
As stated before, there is no male equivalent to gestation; it is
probably more apt to compare artificial insemination to the use of
donor eggs. In regards to surrogacy, courts and legislatures are
truly in uncharted waters. There is no male equivalent procedure
upon which we can base our decisions. Instead, those deciding
how to respond to surrogacy must face, either directly or indirectly,
deeply held feelings and biases about which aspect of
“motherhood”—genetics, gestation, or nurture—defines a
particular woman as a particular child’s mother. As this survey of
the current status of surrogacy shows, pregnancy is still seen as the
pivotal experience that makes a woman a mother.
IV. CONCLUSION
Surrogacy arrangements offer infertile females and their
partners an option that has been available to infertile males in a
number of guises: the chance to parent a child without going
through the adoption process. Yet it is surrogacy, more than any
ART technique, other than perhaps IVF, that draws down the
95. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
96. Id. at 212 (quoting Carey v. Population Services, Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977)).
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culture’s wrath. Techniques that remedy male infertility, even if
they result in a child that is not genetically related to its “father,”
draw little to no comment, much less legislative prohibition. Even
techniques that result in a child that is not genetically related to its
“mother” are respected, as long as the gestation is kept with the
“mother.”
The states that explicitly acknowledge and give rights to
intended mothers are few and far between; the vast majority of
states cannot or will not confront the questions that surrogacy has
raised. Given the growing popularity of surrogacy in all of its
forms, however, we will be forced to confront these questions
sooner or later; one can only hope that we confront them with our
eyes open to the cultural ideas of family, of mother and father, that
color the debate whether we articulate them or not.
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